It is generally accepted that “direct selling” was killed off generations ago by mass merchandising, big box stores, mail-order and then the internet, among other societal changes. The “Fuller Brush man” is long gone. No one’s at home. No one wants or needs or has time for a “personal” salesperson. Everything’s in stores or online. And, even when “direct selling” still lived, no one ever went into that tough line of work thinking they would get rich from it.
Yet, each year, millions are recruited, and pay thousands, for the “opportunity” to work as “direct sellers,” with promises and expectations of “unlimited” income. The number involved today is many, many times greater than ever worked in that “extinct” field decades ago. Billions are being traded on Wall Street for shares of “direct selling” companies. How can this be?
In my book, Ponzinomics, the Untold Story of Multi-Level Marketing, I document the death of “direct selling” and the 1945 invention of “multi-level marketing,” or MLM. I describe how “MLM” falsely assumed direct selling’s revered old identity. I trace MLM from its Adam, a little California-based company called “Nutrilite,” to today’s “industry” led by Amway, Herbalife (HLF) down 64% YTD, Nuskin (NUS) down 31%, USANA Health Sciences (USNA) down 49%, Primerica, Inc. (PRI) down 13%, and Medifast (MED) down 45%. MLM’s financial solicitations for consumers to become “direct sellers” have reached into – and led to losses for – virtually every household in America.
In the newly invented “MLM,” the main source of revenue shifted from end-user customers to the salespeople themselves who are incentivized to “be their own customer” by buying their own products. Obviously, no one makes money purchasing their own inventory, but MLM offered a unique reason to do so – “unlimited” income potential.
No More Need to Knock on Doors
All MLM “direct sellers” can potentially gain “unlimited” income by recruiting an “endless” chain of other “direct sellers.” No need to pound the pavement and get rudely rejected at front doors any more. Each “direct seller” on the chain has to meet a quota to “qualify” for future rewards from their recruits who, in turn, are their “own customers” and recruiters too, ad infinitum. The chain can grow without continuous personal effort. The qualifying quota can usually be met by just making a personal monthly purchase of inventory. “Commissions” on all these transactions, all the way down to the “last ones in,” flow up the chain. In the MLM pay plan, most of the total commissions go to the top 1%. So, all new “direct sellers” try mightily to recruit (and buy) their way to those top ranks. Of course, only a tiny few can ever be at the top.
Some people argued this is a pyramid recruiting scheme, inherently unfair and deceptive, and a counterfeit of direct selling. In the design and the pay plan, bottom ranks – the vast majority – will inevitably lose. They said constantly adding salespeople in any area destroys profitable retail selling potential, if any exists to start with. They cited data on 90-99% loss rates and huge churn rates among new “recruits” and asked, where are the retail “customers”?
While offering no data on retail customers or salespeople losses or market saturation, MLM promoters offered “proof” that MLM is direct selling by pointing to two long-established and respected direct selling companies in their ranks, Avon and Tupperware (TUP). Both companies were members of the Direct Selling Association, DSA, and both were “direct selling” icons, Avon for its “ladies” and Tupperware for its “parties.” To any pyramid scheme accusations, MLM promoters indignantly countered: “Are you calling Avon and Tupperware pyramid schemes?”
Walking Dinosaurs
The truth for both companies is very different from the MLM-spin. Avon and Tupperware used to have differentiated products and real consumer demand. Their salespeople made money from their own retail sales. But moving into the 21st Century, Avon and Tupperware became walking dinosaurs, vestiges of the extinct era of “direct selling.” They were still trying to base their businesses on their historical brands and on person-to-person retail sales to real customers, as direct selling companies always used to do.
Despite MLM’s citing Avon and Tupperware, and thereby bestowing legitimacy on the “MLM” members of the Direct Selling Association, deep differences between those icons of the old era and MLM burst into public view in 2013-14. The two companies publicly quit the Direct Selling Association, charging ethics violations and DSA-member connections to pyramid schemes.
Avon’s Long Good-Bye
Avon had been a true direct seller for decades before MLM was invented. But as the door-to-door model faded, Avon began a long decline. In 2000, Avon began shifting its focus to “incentivizing” salespeople to recruit more salespeople and getting them to buy inventory, MLM-style. In 2009, during the Great Recession, Avon ran its most expensive ad in history, on television during the Super Bowl. The ad never mentioned any Avon products! It only solicited “salespeople.” Still, global revenue dropped continuously over the next 10 years. Avon stock value fell from over $30 to just over $3.
Finally, Avon split off its faltering North American business and sold it to the Korean company, LG Household & Health Care. Avon claimed to have 250,000 sales representatives in North America. The remaining global business was later sold to the Brazilian MLM, Natura (NTCO) down 50% YTD, which also owns the retailer, Body Shop. Though Avon global was much larger, Avon shareholders traded 3 shares of Avon for just one in Natura.
The Korean-owned segment of Avon in North America is now classic MLM, selling the proverbial MLM “income opportunity” along with “health” supplements, make-up, jewelry, clothing, scented candles, even toothpaste.
On the Canadian Avon website, Avon promotes the “income opportunity,” urging prospects in large bold black type: “Think big. Sell Avon part-time, full-time, you decide how much! It’s your business, your way!”
A disclosure (legally required in Canada, but not in the USA) appears midway down a long webpage in tiny, barely visible gray lettering: “The 2020 earnings of a typical Avon Leadership Representative was between $0 and $2,620 in commissions and bonuses.” That’s $0 to $50 a week, before subtracting all costs! And the “disclosure” does not break out how much of that tiny return comes from personal sales or the “downline.”
Avon quietly rejoined the Direct Selling Association. The Brazilian company, Natura, which took over Avon’s global business in 2020, has lost over 60% of its stock value in the last year.
Tupperware on the Brink
Tupperware was one of the first “party plan” companies, which are technically a small subset of MLM. They employ an “endless” recruiting chain, but are more rooted in retail sales transacted at “parties.” Tupperware used to have a popular brand with innovative, differentiated products. But, as true direct selling began to disappear, Tupperware went into decline. It added MLM-type “health and beauty” commodities to bolster recruiting appeal but then deleted them. This year, it began also selling its products in Target department stores. Its kitchen-related goods are generally not distinct from other brands. A 10-months “Income disclosure” for Canada (not published in the USA) showed that half the “party planners” were classified “inactive,” earning less than $30 for the period on average. 94% of the “active” ones reportedly received about $12 a week on average, before expenses.
In the last 5 years, the stock value of Tupperware has dropped over 90%. Its latest financials warned investors the company may violate loan agreements, setting off speculation Tupperware might declare bankruptcy.
The shrunken and devolved state of Avon and Tupperware, the most famous brand-icons of “direct selling,” makes citing them as a defense of “multi-level marketing” as extinct as their old business model.
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